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Abstract
I outline and motivate a way of implementing a closest world theory of
indicatives, appealing to Stalnaker’s framework of open conversational pos-
sibilities. Stalnakerian conversational dynamics helps us resolve two out-
standing puzzles for a such a theory of indicative conditionals. The first
puzzle—concerning so-called ‘reverse Sobel sequences’—can be resolved
by conversation dynamics in a theory-neutral way: the explanation works as
much for Lewisian counterfactuals as for the account of indicatives devel-
oped here. Resolving the second puzzle, by contrast, relies on the interplay
between the particular theory of indicative conditionals developed here and
Stalnakerian dynamics. The upshot is an attractive resolution of the so-called
“Gibbard phenomenon” for indicative conditionals.
Stalnakerian conversational dynamics can help us resolve two outstanding
puzzles for a “closest-world” modal theory of indicative conditionals. I begin
the paper by outlining and motivating a new way of implementing a closest world
theory of indicatives, appealing to Stalnaker’s framework of open conversational
possibilities. Stalnaker’s framework itself shows its utility in application to condi-
tionals by allowing us to explain a puzzling feature of conditionals—concerning
so-called ‘reverse Sobel sequences’—in a theory-neutral way. The explanation
has application to any “closest worlds” account of indicative or counterfactual
conditionals, as well as to other truth-conditional accounts of conditionals. My
favoured closest world theory of indicative conditionals, when combined with
Stalnakerian dynamics, gives an attractive resolution of the so-called “Gibbard
phenomenon” for indicative conditionals.
1 Conditionals
Consider the following two conditionals:
(1) If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did
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(2) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have
The first is an indicative conditional; the second is a counterfactual condi-
tional. I take it that the former is true, and the latter is false. Indicative and
counterfactual conditionals, then, must differ semantically.1
A popular semantics for counterfactual conditionals gives it the following
truth-conditions:2
‘AC’ is true at w iff C holds at all the closest A-worlds to w.3
In such analyses, ‘closest’ is here a technical term, which might then be fur-
ther analyzed: Lewis (1973a, 1979) holds it should be unpacked in terms of the
similarity of possible worlds to one another.
We know from (1) and (2) above that we cannot offer exactly the same seman-
tics for indicative conditionals. Surely, though, the presumption has to be that the
semantics of conditionals share a common form: syntactically they involve the
same connective ‘if’; they exhibit the same logical behaviour.
Let us therefore consider what is going on in the Oswald-Kennedy cases. It
seems right to say that the counterfactual “if Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, some-
one else would have” is false because at the closest worlds where Oswald doesn’t
shoot Kennedy (e.g. his gun doesn’t go off; or he has a last minute change of heart;
or he fires and misses), nobody else shoots Kennedy. Intuitively, why don’t these
close worlds likewise undermine the truth of the indicative conditional? I suggest
it is because such worlds are inconsistent with what is taken as common ground
about the case: that Kennedy got shot. Worlds where Kennedy doesn’t end up
being shot, I suggest, are ignored when evaluating an indicative conditional. The
analysis of indicative conditionals suggested by these thoughts is the following:
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‘A→C’ is true at w iff C holds at all the closest open A-worlds to
w.4
The account of indicative conditionals just mentioned explains why the Oswald-
Kennedy conditionals give different results in the indicative and counterfactual
formulations. In formulating this account, however, we have had to appeal to a
new notion: openness of worlds. I suggest we spell this out using notions drawn
from Stalnaker (1978, 1984). Stalnaker defines the context set, at a given stage of a
conversation, to consist of all those worlds which are not collectively presupposed
not to obtain.5 This fits quite nicely with the gloss given above: that of open
worlds as those which are compatible with all facts that are taken as common
ground. 6
My suggestion, therefore, is that Stalnaker’s context set has more than a prag-
matic role in the analysis of indicative conditionals: it defines which worlds are
‘left out of’ the space of possibilities over which indicative conditionals are de-
fined, and thus enters into the semantics of such conditionals.7
The standard way in which Stalnaker appeals to the context set is quite dif-
ferent. For the next two sections, we shall concentrate on describing how the
Stalnakerian framework can be applied to the special case of conditionals, inde-
pendently of the particular thesis about their truth-conditions just advocated. We
shall see, in section 3, that the Stalnakerian framework can do substantial ex-
planatory work in a theory of conditionals, by explaining in a theory-neutral way
puzzles over so-called ‘Sobel’ and ‘reverse Sobel’ cases. In section 4, I turn to the
interaction between this conversational dynamics and the particular account of se-
mantics for the indicative conditional given above. This combination turns out to
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give an attractive explanation of one outstanding problem for a truth-conditional
account of indicatives: the Gibbard phenomenon.
2 Conversation
Presuppositions change as conversations progress. As Stalnaker defines it, this
will mean that the context set (those worlds which are not ruled out by one of
the presuppositions in force) will be being updated constantly. Stalnaker, indeed,
holds that we can analyse the dynamics of conversations by looking at the effects
that assertions, denials and the like have on the context set. This very general idea
is used to provide illuminating explanations of a number of otherwise puzzling
linguistic phenomena.8
Stalnaker’s explanations are based on a very simple idea about how assertions
interact with the context set. Recall that worlds within the context set are ‘live
conversational possibilities’: for all that we can presuppose in making an asser-
tion, any one of those possibilities might be actual. By uttering S assertorically,
one is committing oneself to S ’s being true no matter which world is actual. If
the assertion is taken on board by one’s conversational partners, then the presup-
position that S is true no matter which world is actual is thereby established. This
will typically change the context set: worlds which, if actual, would make S false,
will be eliminated. The new context set will contain only worlds compatible with
the new common ground. The situation is illustrated in figure 1.
An example: in the pre-existing context, we shall take it that no-one has said
anything to establish any presuppositions about what minerals bananas contain.
Worlds where bananas contain potassium, and worlds where they don’t, are both
5
Figure 1: Effect of uttering “S ” on context set: greyed-out worlds are eliminated.
(P-worlds are worlds where S expresses a truth).
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compatible with all facts that are part of the common ground. Someone now
asserts bananas contain potassium. If this is not challenged, then it becomes part
of the new common ground: the context set is updated by eliminating worlds
where bananas do not contain potassium.
Another example: in the pre-existing context, we take it that no propositions
about the constitution of the watery-stuff in our environment are part of the com-
mon ground: worlds where this role is played by H2O and worlds where it is
played by XYZ are both included in the context set. If I utter “water is H2O”, I
eliminate from the context set every world where uttering “water is H20” would
express a falsehood. For example, worlds where the watery stuff in my environ-
ment (and featuring in the causal history of my usage of ‘water’) is XYZ, for
example, are eliminated.9
What does this general story say about the effects of uttering a conditional, of
whatever sort? In accordance to the general line described above, when we utter
‘if A, C’ this should eliminate all worlds which that utterance expresses something
false. There is one immediate effect of this. On any truth-conditional account of
the conditionals (indicative or counterfactual), the conditional with antecedent A
and consequent C will be false if uttered at an A∧¬C worlds. So no matter what
truth-conditions we think conditionals have, we should say that uttering such a
conditional eliminates from the context set all A∧¬C worlds. The greyed-out
area in figure 2 corresponds to worlds eliminated by asserting “if A, C”:
Depending on the details of the truth-conditions assigned, some of the ¬A-
worlds may also be eliminated. On a Lewisian account of counterfactuals, any ¬A
world which is closer to an A∧C-world than it is to an A∧¬C-world will be elim-
inated from the context set. On the material conditional account of conditionals,
7
Figure 2: Effect on context set of “if A, C” (greyed out area=worlds eliminated)
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by contrast, the only worlds where uttering the conditional is uttering a falsehood
will be A∧¬C-worlds; so (absent further argument) these are the only worlds that
get eliminated. Nothing in what follows will depend on what happens to the ¬A
worlds, so we can ignore these differences for present purposes.10
Below, I look at one way in which applying general Stalnakerian conversa-
tional dynamics to the case of conditionals can explain puzzling features of con-
ditionals: the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences. This explanation will be
applicable to many truth-conditional conditionals: counterfactual as well as in-
dicative. However, since on my account the semantics of indicative conditionals
itself makes appeal to the context set, we can expect some interesting interactions
between Stalnakerian dynamics and conditionals specific to my account. The ac-
count of the Gibbard phenomenon in section 4 illustrates the power of this com-
bination.
3 Reverse Sobel sequences
In the previous section I outlined a very general feature of the effect of asserting
a conditional on the context set of a conversation: it eliminates all A∧¬C worlds,
without exception, from that set.
You might think this is a peculiar result for the ‘closest-worlds’ conditional
theorist. For famously, natural language conditionals give rise to Sobel sequences,
e.g:11
1. If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else shot Kennedy
2. If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy and the National Inquirer was right about
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the existence and character of space aliens12, no-one shot Kennedy
The point here is that natural language conditionals ‘if A, C’, seem to leave
it open that A∧¬C is true at ‘far off’ worlds. But the conversational story we’ve
just given says that all A∧¬C worlds without exception—even ‘far-off’ ones—are
eliminated by the assertion of an ordinary indicative conditional.13
I think that we do indeed rule out all such worlds when asserting an condi-
tional. Nevertheless, I think the acceptability of Sobel sequences can be accounted
for, and further, we can use the setting to explain some prima facie puzzling results
for the variable strict theory of indicative conditionals.
The story about the acceptability of asserting Sobel sequences is the follow-
ing. In asserting ‘If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else shot Kennedy’,
we mean to eliminate all conversational possibilities where neither Oswald nor
anyone else shot Kennedy. What of possibilities where the National Inquirer is
right about space aliens faking the death of celebrities in order to kidnap them?
Clearly, there is normally a presupposition that the actual world is not this way:
such a world is not standardly one of the conversational possibilities. So we need
not take it into consideration when considering whether the assertion was appro-
priate.
On the other hand, there are ways of putting such possibilities into the context
set: one such way, it seems, is just by asserting ‘it might be that the National
Inquirer is right. . . ’.14 Another way, I would contend, is by uttering a conditional
whose antecedent is true only at such a conversational possibility.15 Thus, when
I state the second element of the Sobel sequence, the context set first expands to
incorporate worlds where the National Inquirer is right; and then we eliminate all
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the ‘National Inquirer, Oswald not shooting, someone else shooting’ worlds. The
net effect, then, of asserting (1) and then (2), is that we end up with an expanded
context set, but one without either of the following classes of worlds:
• Worlds where National Inquirer speaks nonsense, Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy,
and no-one shot Kennedy (eliminated by (1)).
• Worlds where the National Inquirer speaks the truth, Oswald didn’t shoot
Kennedy, and someone else shot Kennedy. (eliminated by (2)).
This is illustrated in figure 3.
This seems a perfectly sensible description of the result of making such as-
sertions, and there is nothing to suggest anything bad going on. Nothing in the
story so far rests on any particular truth-conditional account of conditionals: so
it may be appealed to by material-conditionals theorists as well as closest worlds
accounts, whether of counterfactuals or indicatives.
On the other hand, consider the following ‘reverse Sobel sequence’:16
2. If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy and the National Inquirer was right about
the existence and character of space aliens, no-one shot Kennedy.
1. If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else shot Kennedy.
The idea here is to consider a situation where one utters (2) and then (1). In
point of view of consistency, of course, nothing depends on the order in which
things are asserted, so the ‘closest-world’ conditional theorist is standardly taken
to be committed to saying exactly the same thing about this assertion as the stan-
dard Sobel assertions. Yet, the reverse Sobel sequence are far less comfortable—
even infelicitous—to utter.
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Figure 3: Result on context set of uttering Sobel sequence: “if A, C”; “if A and
B, ¬C”. (worlds eliminated by the former in light grey; worlds eliminated by the
latter in dark grey).
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The point I want to make here is that we can explain the difference between the
respective felicity of Sobel and reverse-Sobel patterns of assertion via the conver-
sational dynamics just sketched. In the reversed case, as before, our initial context
set will standardly not contain any worlds at which the National Inquirer reports
truly. But in uttering (2), we introduce such worlds into consideration. The dis-
tinctive effect of asserting that conditional, as before, is to eliminate all “National
Inquirer” worlds where Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, but someone else did.
What would happen if we were now to utter (1)? By our initial discussion of
the conversational dynamics of asserting conditionals, we know it will eliminate
all Oswald-not-shooting and no-one-shooting worlds: in particular, it will elimi-
nate those conversational possibilities where Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, where
no-one else did, and where the National Inquirer is right. Hence, uttering (1) af-
ter (2) would lead to the context set ruling out all three of the following classes of
worlds:
• Worlds where the National Inquirer speaks the truth, Oswald didn’t shoot
Kennedy, and someone else shot Kennedy. (eliminated by (2)).
• Worlds where National Inquirer speaks nonsense, Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy,
and no-one shot Kennedy (eliminated by (1)).
• Worlds where the National Inquirer speaks the truth, Oswald didn’t shoot
Kennedy, and no-one shot Kennedy. (also eliminated by (1)).
This is illustrated in figure 4.
So, the context set resulting from asserting (1) and (2) in the ‘normal’ order
leaves open more worlds than the context set resulting from asserting (2) and (1) in
13
Figure 4: Result on context set of uttering reverse Sobel sequence: “if A and B,
¬C”; “if A, C”. (Worlds eliminated by the former in light grey; worlds eliminated
by the latter in dark grey).
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Figure 5: Blacked out region contains worlds eliminated by reverse Sobel se-
quence but not by Sobel sequence.
the reverse order. We will be able to explain why the Sobel sequence is fine, while
the reverse Sobel sequence is bad, if we can make the case that it is inappropriate
to assert something that eliminates situations of the final class (National Inquirer
speaks truth, neither Oswald nor anyone else shot Kennedy). The disputed class
is highlighted in figure 5.
It seems that such a case is available, for in the envisaged situation we have
no grounds for thinking that such worlds are not actual. If the National Inquirer
is right, then all our pro-shooting-of-Kennedy evidence is the result of a massive
conspiracy, so for all we know, Kennedy wasn’t shot at all. The difference in
the conversational effects of Sobel vs. reverse Sobel sequences thus explains the
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difference in the acceptability of those patterns of assertion.17
The general utility of appeal to conversational dynamics to understand the be-
haviour of conditionals is thus illustrated. To emphasize once again: only conver-
sational effects common to (almost) all truth-conditional accounts of conditionals
have been appealed to in explaining the potential infelicity of reverse Sobel cases
(all that is required is that a conditional never be true at a world where it’s an-
tecedent is true and its consequent false). So again, this explanation is available
to strict and material conditional theorists, Lewisian theorists of counterfactuals,
as well analyses of indicative conditionals of the style advocated in this paper.18
4 The Gibbard phenomenon.
(Gibbard, 1980) argues against truth-conditional theories of conditionals. It is
well-known that material conditional theorists avoid these worries; but they re-
main a standing challenge to stronger accounts of the truth-conditions of indica-
tive conditionals. I shall show how my account of the truth-conditions of indica-
tives, far from falling to Gibbard’s challenge, gives an attractive account of the
phenomenon to which Gibbard points.
I shall follow the presentation of Gibbard phenomenon given by Bennett (2003).
The situation to be considered features a system of water-gates and levers, which
are constructed according to the following rules:
• Lever 1 down and top gate raised: water flows left
• Lever 2 down and top gate raised: water flows right
• Except! that if both levers down, then top gate can’t be raised.
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We have two informants, Abel and Cain. They are each standing next to a
lever, out of sight and earshot of each other. Their job is to tell me what will
happen to the water. Abel can see that the first lever is down. Cain can see that
the second lever is down. They say:
• Abel: “If the top gate is raised, water will flow left, not right”
• Cain: “If the bottom gate is raised, water will flow right, not left”
Both utterances are perfectly appropriate. However, it is clear that what they
say will happen in the event of the gate being raised can’t both take place. The
intuitive, and correct, conclusion for me to draw from this information is that the
top gate will not be raised.
The following is then an argument for the no truth value approach to the in-
dicative conditional. The argument is schematic: using the Abel/Cain case to rule
out each potential truth-conditional approach to the indicative conditional θ:
1. Abel and Cain’s utterances are both true
2. Truth-conditional account θ of indicative conditionals supports
conditional non-contradiction: ¬((A→ B)∧ (A→¬B))
3. Conditional non-contradiction means that it is not the case that Abel and
Cain’s utterances are both true
4. Therefore: θ is not the right account of indicative conditionals.
The first premiss is non-negotiable for present purposes. The argument is
plainly of a valid form, so if one is to resist it to defend a particular truth-conditional
account of indicative conditionals, one must resist either premise (2) or (3).
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A material conditional account of indicative conditionals allows one to resist
at premise (2): for conditional non-contradiction does not hold for material con-
ditionals. Famously, material conditionals suffer from the paradoxes of material
implication. Whenever, A is false, A ⊃ C is true. Thus, whenever A is false,
(A ⊃ C)∧ (A ⊃ ¬C) is true. Note, too, that if (A ⊃ C)∧ (A ⊃ ¬C) is to be true,
it follows that A is false. So, in the Abel/Cain case, if we take on board what
each of our informants say, we would expect to be able to derive ‘the top gate
will not open”. This seems exactly right: it is what we should conclude from that
testimony.
Material conditional accounts of indicative conditionals are, however, inde-
pendently objectionable. Our interest is in seeing whether “closest world” ac-
counts of indicatives fall to Gibbard-style considerations. I contend that the ap-
proach advocated in this paper allows one to rebut the argument directly.19
We begin by noting a loophole in the argument available to all modal ac-
counts of the conditional: strict conditional theorists as well as ‘closest world’
theorists. (2), as stated, fails in some special instances. The failure of conditional
non-contradiction in the material case is founded upon the paradoxes of material
implication. The failure in the modal conditional case is founded on a similar
result. The so-called paradoxes of strict implication state that if A is false at all
worlds, then (A J C) is true no matter what C is. Under the same conditions, the
‘closest worlds’ conditional A >C is true:20 in this case, the result is known as the
vacuous truth of conditionals with impossible antecedents.21
However, these are the only exceptions to conditional non-contradiction modal
accounts allow. So, from the truth of Cain and Abel’s utterances, we can appar-
ently derive that opening the gate is impossible. If we patch the argument scheme
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by adding the premise that the relevant antecedent is possible, then we appear to
have sealed the loophole just sketched.
But this response crucially depends by what is meant by ‘impossible’. If we
are giving a standard Lewisian account of the counterfactual conditional, then
counterfactuals A C will be vacuously true only when A is impossible in the
sense of being false at all metaphysically possible worlds. But on the account of
indicative conditionals I advocate, the relevant ‘possible worlds’ are all and only
those within the context set—those which are ‘open possibilities’ in our conversa-
tional context. Thus, in the relevant sense, for A to be impossible is for no A world
to be within the context set—that is, for ¬A to be implicit in the common ground
of that stage of the conversation. My account of the truth-conditions of indicative
conditionals, therefore, looks like it is well placed to exploit the loophole in the
Gibbardian argument, and allow for both Abel’s and Cain’s utterances to both be
true in a single context. Unlike the analysis of Sobel and reverse-Sobel discussed
earlier, this way of responding to the Gibbard phenomenon crucially depends on
the particular analysis of indicative conditionals I laid out in section 1.22
I end by noting that the account of conversational dynamics with which we
have been working predicts that the result of taking on board the reports of both
Abel and Cain in the Gibbardian situation is exactly one where the common an-
tecedent is false throughout the open conversational possibilities. That is, apply-
ing general principles of conversational dynamics, we predict the emergence of a
single context where both conditionals are true.
Recall that the basic effect of asserting the indicative conditional ‘if A, C’ is to
remove any A∧¬C worlds from the context set. So if conversational participants
assert both ‘if A, C’ and ‘if A, ¬C’, then all A∧¬C and all A∧C worlds will be
19
Figure 6: Assertion of “if A, C” eliminates light grey worlds; assertion of “if A,
¬C” eliminates dark grey worlds.
eliminated from the context set. That is, all A worlds whatsoever are eliminated
from the context set.23 In the Gibbardian case, the net result of the two assertions
is a situation where only ¬A worlds remain in the context set. Thus, as required,
conversational dynamics predicts the emergence of a context where (on my ac-
count of the indicative conditional) Abel and Cain’s utterances are both true. The
situation is illustrated in figure 5.
We have exploited the loophole in the Gibbardian argument to defend an ac-
count of the Gibbard phenomenon whereby both Abel and Cain’s utterances are
true within a single context: we do this because, on our favoured account, Stal-
naker’s context set provides the range of open possibilities which feed into the
20
semantics of the indicative conditional. On this interpretation, both conditionals
are true just when the context set contains no A-possibilities: which is exactly
what we find emerging once both assertions have been made.24
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Notes
1The example is due to Adams (1975).
2I use ‘’ for the counterfactual conditional, ‘→’ for the indicative condi-
tional; and ‘>’ for an arbitrary conditional.
3A-worlds are worlds at which A is true. The account may need to be amended
if the so-called ‘limit assumption’ is denied—see Lewis (1973b)—but not in ways
that effect the present discussion.
4Compare Nolan (2003), who also tries to build a ‘closest world’ account of
indicatives on top of the Lewisian treatment of counterfactuals, by appealing to
knowledge. Nolan’s approach is to define a new notion of ‘closeness’, whereby
worlds incompatible with what we know are ipso facto ‘far away’ from actuality.
Stalnaker (1975, p.71), giving one of the earliest defences of a ‘closest world’ ac-
count of indicatives, is even closer to the present proposal. But again, he suggests
that an indicative conditional is defined over a space of worlds whose ‘closeness
ordering’ is altered to favour worlds within the context set. And again, this subtle
difference will be crux of the story about the Gibbard phenomenon here offered.
My account, in contrast, eliminates such worlds altogether from the space of
worlds over which the conditional is defined (that is, my framework is not uni-
versal in the sense of Lewis (1973a, p.120)). This difference will have substantial
knock-on effects when we come to look at Gibbard cases.
Note also that we do not have to presuppose some substantive account of
counterfactual closeness (say, along the lines of (Lewis, 1979)) to buy into my
proposal: even if the notion of counterfactual closeness is primitive, or analyzed
in terms of counterfactuals rather than the other way round, we can obviously still
appeal to it when giving the truth-conditions of indicatives, in the way described
in the main text.
5Presumably one can presuppose something which is false: in which case the
actual world may not be an open possibility. (In Stalnaker’s framework, in pre-
supposing p where p is in fact false, we are in effect presupposing that the actual
world does not obtain.) For this observation, and discussion of its potential im-
pact on the logic of indicative conditionals, see Nolan (2004): the threat is that
instances of modus ponens fail.
The threat of unacceptable logical revisionism does not arise for those (such
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as Nolan (2003) and Weatherson (2001)) who use factive attitudinal states (such
as knowledge) instead of presupposition, within their account of indicative close-
ness. There are a number of options at this point: (Nolan, 2004) canvasses some
options. Since I am not inclined to regard modus ponens as negotiable, the rel-
evant alternatives for me are (a) to defend some broadly epistemic (and factive)
substitute for Stalnakerian presuppositions; or (b) to tweak the setup laid out in
the main text so that the actual world will always count as an ”open possibility”
even if it presupposed not to obtain. I discuss these issues in other work.
6One can make judgements about indicative conditionals in non-conversational
situations. But there is a natural understanding about what ‘open worlds’ are in
that setting: the worlds compatible with what we believe (or know) to be the case.
7Formally, take the set of worlds W and closeness-ordering σ over which the
counterfactual conditional is defined. Given the context set C, the set of worlds
over which the indicative conditional is defined as follows: W′ := C ∩W. The
ordering is just that induced by σ: if x is closer than z to y on the original space of
worlds, and x,y,z ∈W′, then x is closer than z to y on the derived space of worlds.
8A very nice example is the treatment of negative existentials in Stalnaker
(1978).
9Compare Stalnaker (1984, ch.4.). Given the actual world is an H2O world,
Kripkean orthodoxy has it that “water is H2O” is true relative to every world.
Nevertheless, those same sounds, uttered on twin-earth, would express a falsehood
(they would not express the same proposition).
10I suggest that the conversational effects of asserting an indicative conditional
with the truth-conditions suggested earlier are the same as those described for
the material conditional: once the A∧¬C worlds are eliminated from the context
set, there are no open A∧¬C possibilities, and hence vacuously, every world in
the context set is such that C holds at every closest open A-world. Of course,
this doesn’t mean there are no differences between the material conditional and
closest-world conditional under consideration, but just that their typical effects on
the context set are identical.
11The case below is formulated with indicative conditionals. For Sobel se-
quences of counterfactuals, see Lewis (1973a, ch.1.).
12I am taking it that the National Inquirer holds that space aliens are generally
inclined to fake the death of celebrities in order to cover up the fact that they have
kidnapped them.
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13Analogous remarks apply to the assertion of a counterfactual conditional.
14This role for ‘might’ utterances is advocated in Swanson (2005).
15That is, I contend that in uttering ‘if A then C’, there must either be, or one
must introduce into, the context set worlds where A is true. Compare Stalnaker
(1975, p.81), who advocates the rule ‘it is appropriate to make an indicative con-
ditional statement or supposition only in a context which is compatible with the
antecedent’. If the an indicative conditional is put forward where the pre-existing
context set does not fit this description, then we change the context set to accom-
modate the assertion, by bringing in extra worlds.
16Reverse Sobel sequences seem to first appear in print in a paper by Kai von
von Fintel (2001). von Fintel credits Irene Heim for communicating the phe-
nomenon to him.
17You might eliminate such worlds as a byproduct of ruling out worlds where
the National Inquirer is right about such matters; but if this is ones reason, Gricean
reasoning would suggest that one should simply assert this straight out, rather than
uttering the indicative.
Andrew McGonigal pointed out another predication of the present account
that seems to be borne out: in cases where the final class of worlds is empty, then
we shouldn’t expect Sobel and reverse Sobel to differ. There are trivial cases of
this (where the antecedent is repeated, or adjoined to its contrary). But potentially
there are more interesting test cases: where the Sobel sequences are A > C, (A∧
B) > ¬C, and there is a standing presumption against A∧B∧¬C worlds.
18Gillies (2005) (independently of the present work) gives a detailed explana-
tion of the Sobel/reverse Sobel difference for the particular case of a strict condi-
tional account of counterfactuals, in ways that are similar in spirit to those given
above.
19The solution is ‘incompatibilist’ in the sense of (Lycan, 2001, ch.8.): the two
informants are vindicated, but only by denying the relevant instance of conditional
non-contradiction. Unlike the proposals of Nolan (2003) and Lycan (2001), (and
many of the proposals outlined in Lycan (2001, ch.8 fn.4)) I deny premiss (2)
rather than premise (3) of the relevant instance of the argument scheme above.
Lycan (2001) says:
. . . one further option open to us, which no one has yet explored,
is to deny Conditional Non-Contradiction in the first place. (Lycan,
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2001, p.176)
What I note below is that standard modal accounts of the conditional already have
a loophole whereby they can deny instances of Conditional Non-contradiction.
Plausibly to exploit this loophole and resolve the Gibbard phenomenon (and set-
ting aside the material conditional account of indicatives), one needs something
like the modal account of the indicative conditional that I have given.
20Recall, we use > as a variable over conditionals.
21In the gloss of the truth-conditions given above, the conditional is to be true if
the consequent is true at all closest A-worlds. If there are no A worlds, then vac-
uously, the consequent is true at all A worlds, and a fortiori all closest A worlds.
Closest worlds accounts of conditionals are often formulated with an additional
clause making the vacuous truth case explicit.
22Thus, it will have nothing to say about putative examples of the Gibbard phe-
nomenon involving counterfactual rather than indicative conditionals. Orthodoxy
suggests there are no such cases; for debate, see Edgington (1995, 1997) and Mor-
ton (1997).
23One might think, for Gricean reasons, that one should simply assert ¬A; but of
course, the present case is one in which two different individuals are each asserting
one piece of information.
24My account need have no truck, therefore, with the suggestion that the way to
deal with Gibbard cases is to think that Abel and Cain’s utterances are true in their
respective contexts. Such contextualist responses to the Gibbard phenomenon
appear to me highly unattractive. There are also worries that if conditionals are
sensitive to highly local context in this way, then apparent disagreements about
conditionals will be depicted as people ‘talking past’ one another. It is a virtue of
the present account that all such worries are quieted.
Nolan (2003) offers an account of the truth-conditions of indicative condi-
tionals in some ways very close to mine. As noted above, he suggests that worlds
incompatible with what we know to be the case are ipso facto further away. How-
ever, this means that Nolan cannot avail himself of the loophole to Gibbard’s
argument I identify: since Abel and Cain’s utterances will not be vacuously true.
To give a sense in which they are both true, he must think that the metric of worlds
shifts according to whether it is Abel or Cain that is speaking. Relative to metric
on worlds generated shared conversational knowledge, Abel and Cain’s condition-
als will probably turn out false, on Nolan’s account.
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Another advocate of worlds-semantics for indicative conditionals is Weath-
erson (2001) (I read Weatherson’s excellent article only after completing this pa-
per). Weatherson’s framework differs from the one I advocate at a number of
points (e.g. unlike the approaches favoured by Nolan and myself, counterfactual
closeness of worlds does not play a significant role in Weatherson’s characteriza-
tion of indicative closeness of worlds). However, his account and mine are similar
in allowing both informants in the Gibbard scenario to be speaking truly in ‘vi-
olation’ of the relevant instance of conditional non-contradiction—Weatherson
achieves this by introducing an “impossible world” where everything is true, and
allowing its closeness to actuality to vary according to the epistemic states of the
agents concerned. In recent work, Weatherson has abandoned this account of the
Gibbard phenomenon in favour one based on relativism about the truth-values of
conditionals.
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